Wow, what a bug. I expect the exploit is literally as simple as trying to ssh in as a user with the password has ‘*’ in /etc/shadow and typing anything as the password.
To the extent that systems that are configured in the vulnerable manner exist in the wild, I’m surprised they weren’t exploited years ago by trivial ssh bots.
P.S. Wow, I’m reminded of just how awful traditional UNIX-y C APIs and code are.
P.P.S. The musl code in question is nuts. The API it implements is awful. Seriously, here’s the manpage:
How do you break back into your digital life? You wake up in a strange place. Something happened. Everything's gone. No wallet/keys/smartphone/tablet/laptop. How would you get back into your digital life given only a laptop with access to the Internet, unless something, somewhere is passwordauthenticate=yes.
Yeah your vault has password authentication. Your password manager in other words. Your vault is where you store your private ssh keys, and or the passwords for the keys.
Seems slightly confusing that the OpenSSH release notes page says:
> This release contains a critical security workaround that affects Linux systems that use the musl libc and PAM disabled.
But that there's nothing about it on their security page.
Even if it's not technically a bug in their code, the fact that they've made a "critical" release to address it suggests that it should probably be listed on the security page as well. But maybe (hopefully) they just haven't updated the security page yet.
14 comments:
Wow, what a bug. I expect the exploit is literally as simple as trying to ssh in as a user with the password has ‘*’ in /etc/shadow and typing anything as the password.
To the extent that systems that are configured in the vulnerable manner exist in the wild, I’m surprised they weren’t exploited years ago by trivial ssh bots.
P.S. Wow, I’m reminded of just how awful traditional UNIX-y C APIs and code are.
P.P.S. The musl code in question is nuts. The API it implements is awful. Seriously, here’s the manpage:
https://man.archlinux.org/man/crypt.3.en
You can’t call this function correctly. sshd’s “fix” is basically to assume that a too-short return is an error return instead of a success return.
PAM is also awful, but this is worse.
musl only, the quick fix:
Which is a good advice in general.How do you break back into your digital life? You wake up in a strange place. Something happened. Everything's gone. No wallet/keys/smartphone/tablet/laptop. How would you get back into your digital life given only a laptop with access to the Internet, unless something, somewhere is passwordauthenticate=yes.
Yeah your vault has password authentication. Your password manager in other words. Your vault is where you store your private ssh keys, and or the passwords for the keys.
Who does PasswordAuthentication=yes in this day and age anyway.
People who use AuthenticationMethods "publickey,password"
You must present a key first after which you must enter a password.
Seems slightly confusing that the OpenSSH release notes page says:
> This release contains a critical security workaround that affects Linux systems that use the musl libc and PAM disabled.
But that there's nothing about it on their security page.
Even if it's not technically a bug in their code, the fact that they've made a "critical" release to address it suggests that it should probably be listed on the security page as well. But maybe (hopefully) they just haven't updated the security page yet.
I'm sure some people running lightweight containers just had a heart attack.
I would imagine the vast majority of lightweight containers don't contain an ssh server?
Workaround? Why not a fix?
AFAIU because the bug is in musl and not in OpenSSH
I presume Dropbear, thus musl-based OpenWrt routers are also not affected? Not that Dropbear has been an example in that regard.
Since after you posted, various people in the thread have reported dropbear is not affected
slop