This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
> We don't know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential with cross-customer access, or something else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com both carried the code.
Interesting that it is not necessarily a supply chain attack a la LiteLLM/some of the other recent breaches. Possibly just a mass compromise of customer passwords.
Yes. But many, if not most of the affected sites where 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable. Some random ad financed site are different stories, there you might just move one.
> 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable.
It's not all or nothing. NoScript [0] lets you run JS (and other specific types of content) from domains and/or sub-domains you allow and reject from those you don't. So you'd allow JS from my-serious-business domain and their CDN, and disallow all else, including those mentioned in the linked article.
I visited at least 2 of the listed sites. I don't own any crypto, so no problem there. I might have entered my credit card details to some site, definitely not to the 2 listed ones. But with the whole "load 300 scripts" cancer in "modern" web you never know.
I guess all I can do now is emptying my browser cache to be on the safe side. The writeup (piece of marketing for their product) has no section for affected end users
Yes, I sometimes used NoScript and uBlock Matrix, but gave up on those because it's a tedious job to manage your allow lists.
Perhaps at last these unserious names will be abandoned as newsworthy failures become more common in the industry. Viz., gravitas may start to have obvious market value again.
These are not static scripts. Their content changes frequently. The customer is using them to inject dynamic content into their own sites. What you are describing would not work for this use case.
It's one of those sentences that seems like it's meaningful on first glance but that in reality conveys no information. For whatever reason LLMs are experts at cranking these sentences out.
Yes, AI is making it much easier to hack - you can just spin up a bunch of instances to look for vulnerabilities, you don't even need to do much manual work
tl;dr: Someone gained write access to the script Optimizely serves on its customers' websites, and they injected malware.
What is interesting is that the write access wasn't just for a single customer, but hundreds. So either tenancy isn't strong enough, or the level of access involved in the compromise was pretty severe.
Just stop using JS... If you control the server why not have the vendor have a server level integtration that way you are not serving any remote scripts. It would be interesting to do a study on how many of these compromise emnate from third party scripts and I am willing to bet it is over 90%
31 comments:
This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
> How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
It doesn't cost them anything but a "whoops" post when they fuck up, so the incentive is misaligned (as you noted under repercussions).
The cost is externalised onto everyone else not them so it's not going to change.
This is the only answer
This wasn’t a release. It was their engine that emits the variants being compromised.
None of that is part of commercial web dev culture. Leftpad-level dependencies are.
Please tell me in whose incentive it is to change any of this and hold the sites accountable?
Who cares? Next week you forget about this and move on
> We don't know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential with cross-customer access, or something else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com both carried the code.
Interesting that it is not necessarily a supply chain attack a la LiteLLM/some of the other recent breaches. Possibly just a mass compromise of customer passwords.
This is exactly the kind of use case for NoScript - reduce exposure to potentially malicious content.
Yes. But many, if not most of the affected sites where 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable. Some random ad financed site are different stories, there you might just move one.
> 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable.
It's not all or nothing. NoScript [0] lets you run JS (and other specific types of content) from domains and/or sub-domains you allow and reject from those you don't. So you'd allow JS from my-serious-business domain and their CDN, and disallow all else, including those mentioned in the linked article.
[0] https://noscript.net/
Optimizely is a pretty garbage platform so this is unsurprising. Love the work though folks like report uri are doing finding this.
dupe 2 hours ago, 15 comments: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50523300
it's been merged
Nope
Hm, which one is the original? The merged article actually looked very informative: https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skim...
whereas the one that we are commenting on now looks like an ad: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w...
It opens with:
> This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can ...
It's otherwise nearly the same information.
It would be kind of ironic if the hijacking warning article got hijacked, I guess?
Why should browsers be allowed to read or write user files without user intervention and serious warnings?
what are the practical effects of this? Does this mean that a customer of Zoom was downloading malware all day?
I visited at least 2 of the listed sites. I don't own any crypto, so no problem there. I might have entered my credit card details to some site, definitely not to the 2 listed ones. But with the whole "load 300 scripts" cancer in "modern" web you never know.
I guess all I can do now is emptying my browser cache to be on the safe side. The writeup (piece of marketing for their product) has no section for affected end users
Yes, I sometimes used NoScript and uBlock Matrix, but gave up on those because it's a tedious job to manage your allow lists.
Perhaps at last these unserious names will be abandoned as newsworthy failures become more common in the industry. Viz., gravitas may start to have obvious market value again.
Optimizely is such crap... like, all it does is A/B test different landing pages/etc for "conversions." We don't need this.
Reminder that this problem has been solved for a while now if admins were not so lazy: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Defens...
These are not static scripts. Their content changes frequently. The customer is using them to inject dynamic content into their own sites. What you are describing would not work for this use case.
> The malware was a multi-purpose kit.
Somehow this sentence immediately flags this article as AI slop.
It's one of those sentences that seems like it's meaningful on first glance but that in reality conveys no information. For whatever reason LLMs are experts at cranking these sentences out.
Is it just me or is there an increase of these events or increase of these posts?
Yes, AI is making it much easier to hack - you can just spin up a bunch of instances to look for vulnerabilities, you don't even need to do much manual work
Some of it's real, the rest is a psy-op. It's not hard to figure out what the goal is.
tl;dr: Someone gained write access to the script Optimizely serves on its customers' websites, and they injected malware.
What is interesting is that the write access wasn't just for a single customer, but hundreds. So either tenancy isn't strong enough, or the level of access involved in the compromise was pretty severe.
Just stop using JS... If you control the server why not have the vendor have a server level integtration that way you are not serving any remote scripts. It would be interesting to do a study on how many of these compromise emnate from third party scripts and I am willing to bet it is over 90%
stop using scripts fullstop the web was never intended to send program code
any program code should run on the webserver
browsers should be minimalist and only support html
In the age of AI if you use third party libraries you deserve all hell unleashed on you
First thing I add to my agents.md is do not use third party libraries, frameworks, fonts, icons, etc unless strictly necessary, ask first